

The Economic Club of New York

Does China Mean World War III?

The Honorable Walter H. Judd
Member of Congress from Minnesota

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Mr. Trippe, Senator McMahon, distinguished guests, and members of The Economic Club of New York:

The question on which I will speak is: Does China Mean world War III? While nobody can answer that with any finality because no one knows what is going on in the minds of the men in the Kremlin, my own answer is that our struggle with Communist China will not mean world war if we win the struggle, that is, if we take the measure necessary to prevent consolidation of the Communist position in China which would permit the Soviet Union to turn its full attention and strength to Europe or the Middle East. Then we would have World War III. If we do not succeed in preventing consolidation of Communist conquests of China, I think the answer is probably “Yes.”

For a decision of the hard-headed men in the Kremlin to start or not start on World War III will not depend on whether we insult them or soothe their feeling. They do not belong to the age of chivalry. It will depend on whether we let our side in the world get weak enough or their side strong enough so that they think they can win. That will mean either surrender by us or war, and since we will not surrender, it will be war.

Therefore we must prevent any further gains in strength by the Kremlin. That means, first of all, that we must find a way to halt the expansion of armed Communism in Asia and begin the process of weakening its hold on the areas it has already conquered.

At least part of the way to prevent the war for Europe is to win the war we are already in, in Asia. To try to end the war in Asia, as some suggest, by yielding on this or that, no matter what the face-saving device, would be to start war in Europe or the Middle East.

In a time of such confusion, the first thing is to get back to basic principles. What is the first objective of a nation's foreign policy? Surely, it must always be one thing: To preserve a nation's security. Conceivably we can solve all our housing problems, our old age problems, health problems, educational problems, get better highways and get better air transportation--if that is possible--and greater development of our natural resources and better transportation under the railroads--if that is possible--and all the other things we are properly concerned about. But if we get all those, if we do not safeguard the security of the nation and if we get into a world war, or especially if we are defeated in that war or bleed ourselves white, then there is not one of those great achievements that will be worth anything to Americans.

If the first business of the nation's foreign policy is to give it security, we will just have to admit that our government has not been doing it very well. When military phases of war are fought with such brilliance that we win a total unconditional surrender of all our enemies, and then we

lose that victory within five years after it has been won, the political conduct of war and the postwar period must have been very bad indeed. It is that which has led us to this moment of peril.

Why have our political relations with the rest of the world been handled so badly? The major reason in my judgment was blindness in our high places--failure or refusal to realize the nature, the objectives and the methods of the forces that were at work against us in the world, and to govern ourselves accordingly.

Instead of facing reality, we preferred to nourish illusions. The first was this: That the Soviet Union is a peace-loving democracy.

Now I can understand how some people came to that conclusion. During the war this was the thinking: We are fighting Hitler. We are a democracy. The Soviet Union is fighting Hitler, and therefore it is a democracy.

Of course that conclusion does not follow. I do not begrudge a cent of the money or a bit of the assistance we gave to the Soviet Union during the war when it was fighting Hitler. It saved tens of thousands of American lives. It was right to help Russia against our first enemy at that time--the Axis. It was wrong for anybody to assume that because the Soviets were fighting Hitler to

save their own necks, they, therefore, believed in the same kind of world we believed in and would cooperate with us at the end of the war to build a good free society.

In order to prove to them our goodwill, and thereby supposedly win theirs, we weakened ourselves, sacrificed our principles--remember the Atlantic Charter!--and made a secret deal with the gangsters at the expense of our own loyal Allies. Such a course could only lead to disaster, and as it has. It has already cost more than 6,000 innocent American lives and our country has greater insecurity than ever before in our history.

Let us end once and for all this notion that the Kremlin, or any of its satellites, is or can be a peace-loving democracy. Nothing in the 500 year history of Russian expansion at the expense of its neighbors; nothing in the Communist documents which are their scriptures; nothing in the experience of those people like Chiang Kai-shek in China, Petkov in Bulgaria, or Masaryk in Czechoslovakia, or our own leaders who tried their best to get along with the Kremlin, justifies any such tragically erroneous assumption that they want the kind of world that we want.

A second miscalculation was the belief that the independence of China and of Asia was less important to our security than the independence of Western Europe. As a result, our government abandoned what had been the sound policy designed to give us security in the West: maintaining the "Open Door" in China.

For almost a hundred years our government, under whichever political party, had insisted upon the independence of China and supported whatever government was in power in China, whether good, bad or indifferent, rather than permit China's great potential might to come under the control and an outside power that might be hostile to us. There were only two such powers in Asia, Japan and Russian. The hard fact of geography was such that it was impossible for either of those nations to threaten us so long as China, in the rear or on the long southern flank, remained independent or friendly to the United States.

In pursuit of that policy, President William McKinley and President Theodore Roosevelt supported the Manchu Dynasty, as corrupt as any that ever existed, against the imperialist powers of Europe.

Woodrow Wilson in 1915 supported the Yuan-Shih-kai government which was unspeakable bad, rather than let Japan impose on China the Twenty-one Demands. He kept first things first--not necessarily a good government, not necessarily as honest a government as we would like, but these were secondary. First was the security of the United States.

Elihu Root and Charles Evans Hughes at the 1921 Washington Conference continued to base our whole Far Eastern policy on support of the independence of China, even though all it had at that time was a half dozen rotten warlord governments.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Cordell Hull supported the Chiang Kai-shek government, which was by far the best China had in hundreds of years, to the extent of going to war with Japan rather than let Japan's militarists get control of the territory, the resources and the manpower of China and then the rest of East Asia to develop them for use against ourselves.

The idea that Europe is more important to our security than Asia arose from a third unproved assumption, mainly the belief that industrial capacity is the controlling factor in determining world power. Western Europe and we have the two best workshops in the world, but a workshop is just no good without raw materials; and Western Europe does not have anything like an adequate supply of the raw materials. Furthermore, we cannot furnish them even if we had the money. We, ourselves, have to import part of all of 64 critical war materials from abroad.

There are five main factors of power: first, is morale, which one cannot measure accurately but which I believe is far higher today in the Communist world than in the free world.

Second, is productive capacity, in which we now lead, but in which the other side can gradually catch us, as proved when it constructed the atomic bomb.

The other three are territory, raw materials and manpower.

In these three the Soviets will be far ahead of us if they get Asia, the Middle East and Africa, as will certainly follow unless we go to war to defend those areas. Thus the Soviets can catch us in the one field where we lead, but we can never catch them in the three where they lead.

We tend to worship the machine and neglect the men, resources and the territory, which are also necessary if we are to prevent war or be able to wage it successfully if it comes.

A fourth miscalculation is the belief that we can keep Europe independent, secure and friendly, even if Asia is taken over by the Soviet Union and its fifth column. Or to put it another way, that we and the Western Europeans can protect their workshop and their skilled manpower by efforts in Europe alone. That is to underestimate two other deterrents to Soviet attack on Western Europe which many of us believe are even stronger deterrents.

One is this: Not what our side's land forces can do to Russia's land forces in Western Europe, but what we can do to her own factories, communications and cities in Russia operating from air bases in England behind the English Channel, from Spain behind the Pyrenees, and from North Africa behind the Mediterranean and Red Sea. We should do as much of our fighting as possible from where we can best get at their strength and they are least able to get at ours.

The other major deterrent to all-out war is to have strong resistant forces existent in Asia -- China, Korea, Japan particularly, Russia's Asiatic flank -- so as to compel her to divide her

strength between two widely-separated fronts and fight a two-front war if she starts one.

However limited in capacity and vulnerable as are our communications across the Pacific, Russia's across Siberia are far more so.

Some of us have long advanced the thesis that the most important issue at stake in World War II -- and in World War III, if by default we permit it to develop -- is this: Whose ideas are to dominate in the development of the under-developed areas of the world?

Hitler understood this. He said: "If Germany were to take Europe that would not solve German's problem because there are no undeveloped areas in Europe." He had to have Europe as a base.

Japan understood it. That is why she worked so long and hard to get control of China and the other areas as a stepping stone to world conquest.

The Communists have understood it from the beginning. Lenin in 1923 wrote: "In the last analysis the outcome of the world struggle will be determined by the fact that Russia, India and China constitute the overwhelming majority of the population of the globe." Only we seem not to understand the importance to ourselves of almost a billion and a quarter of the people of the world who are just emerging from the Middle Ages, learning how to use machines to increase their production, and modern weapons to increase their destructive capacity.

Our country heretofore has had a favored position. In the past, if two other groups were to get into conflict, we stood in a detached position and then threw in our weight on one balance of the other. But that day is gone. We are no longer choosing which balance. We are one of the balances. It is what other people do -- whether they go with us or go with the other side -- which will be decisive.

At the end of the war Russia had less than 200,000,000 people. Today she has 800,000,000. The free world -- ourselves, the North Atlantic Countries, the Western Hemisphere, and other countries including the British Commonwealth -- has grown to about 800,000,000 people. Where are the people who make up the great balance? Which way is it to tip? They are the 700,000,000 people who live on the borders of China, from Korea to Japan, the Philippines, around through India, through the Middle East. What happens to them in the immediate future depends largely on what we do. What happens to us in the long run depends on which way they go.

Where are the main undeveloped areas in the world? South America, Africa and Asia. But only Asia has great undeveloped natural resources plus great undeveloped human resources.

Which system will the billion people in Asia follow in their development: The Soviet system, or the free system of the West? That is likely to be the decisive question of our century.

Which way Asia goes depends largely on what happens in China. Why? In a large part because of the geography of the continent. East Asia is like a giant hand: China is the body of the hand. The hand has 12 fingers: Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Burma, Indo-China, Siam, Malaya, Indonesia, the Philippines, Formosa, Japan and Korea. The Russians are after the hand because if they get it they can pretty much control in the long run what happens in the fingers. We have been spending dollars, 17 billion already, to try and hold the tip of this finger, Korea, but if we drive the Communists back to the 38th parallel, if we drive them back to the Yalu River, what have we accomplished? We have killed a lot of Americans. And as soon as we leave, the Communists can come right back in again. There is not any way you can solve the problem of Korea as long as the Chinese are in control of Manchuria. The Russians saw it; everybody else saw it; why didn't our government see it, or if it did see it why didn't it do something to try and prevent the taking over of Manchuria by the Chinese instead of insisting that Chiang Kai-shek withdraw at the end of 1945 and allow, by his withdrawal, 400 thousand half armed Communists to move into Manchuria and get hold of the stored-up stocks of Japanese supply and go to war against ourselves? Whether we like it or not, the crucial area in Asia always has been and still is China. Why did those in authority in our Government forget that for the first time in our history? Right after V-J Day, the Daily Worker published the Kremlin's instructions to the Communists in this country: "the key task is to stop American intervention in China," (which is Communist lingo for "stop American assistance to China.")

They knew in the Kremlin, as everyone else should have known, that without the right kind of assistance including moral support from us, the Chinese government could not possibly recover. It had been through too much stress and strain, beginning with the Japanese attack in 1937 when it had not yet had time or opportunity to become strong. It had had struggle with too much poverty, illiteracy, provincialism, traditionalism, too long a Japanese invasion, too much Communist sabotage and rebellion, too much inflation, hunger and disease, too many millions of displaced persons, along with too few trained civil servants and administrators, too few who understood that nationalism means putting country ahead of family -- a brand new idea in China -- and so on/

After eight years of war with Japan, and twenty years of international struggle with Communists, China could not possibly recover without patient support and assistance of the right sort from us any more than Greece or Italy or France could. Even Great Britain would have gone down if we had not come to her aid with enormous quantities of money and material, in comparison with which China's requirements were small indeed.

What other task could be more vital to the Kremlin's plans for conquest of Asia, then of Europe and then of ourselves, than to beguile Americans into withholding our support, sympathy and effective assistance from our weakened ally as it tried almost single-handed to hold the line against Communist subversion and internal aggression.

The Daily Worker summed it up in this sentence right after V-J Day when they said: “The war in China is the key of all problems on the international front . . .”

Not Japan, not German, not the Mediterranean, not the Balkans, not the oil of the Middle East, not the North Atlantic or any of the other areas where we have focused our efforts--but China. While we were seeking to forget China and its troublesome war against the Communists, the Kremlin was working to win that war and the crucial victory which it knew would represent its never-ending warfare against us, and all the free world.

Look for a moment at the skillful methods it used here in America to help achieve its interests in Asia. One particularly successful technique was to put over the belief that the Communists in Asia were different, that they were simple agrarian reformers. The Communist movement in China was pictured as just a spontaneous, indigenous, peasant uprising against alleged landlordism, war-lordism, medieval feudalism and the rest. Therefore, Communist victory in what was misrepresented as merely a civil war between two factions within China was not to be feared or considered dangerous to our security. Chinese Communists were said to be first Chinese and second Communists, not at all a part of or subservient to the Kremlin’s vast conspiracy to conquer the world. Therefore they would doubtless be just as friendly to us, and probably better for the Chinese than our ally, the legitimate government of China, which was always described by the propagandists as the “corrupt and reactionary Chiang Kai-shek regime.”

When history is written, it will seem fantastic that supposedly smart, enlightened and sophisticated Americans could be so easily beguiled into accepting this complete myth about China's Communism, and that we would base our country's foreign policies on that myth and the others which were so skillfully developed and sold to many of our opinion-forming agencies and to the policy-makers in our State Department. Let me remind you of just a few of them.

One was the myth, successfully propagated during the war, and advocated by General Stilwell, "that we must arm the Communists because they were said to be doing most of the fighting against the Japanese." That was not so. They inflicted less than 10% of the casualties on the Japanese. But the myth did its job and at a crucial period in American thinking built up the Reds and built down the Chinese government.

Then when events proved that myth false, there was another: "that the Communists were not dangerous because they were country people; they would not take the cities." Well, you have seen them take the cities. Then the propagandists said, "But they are northerners. They would not take South China. After all, China is too big; probably it ought to be split along the Yangtze River. Let the Communists take North China, and let the government have South China. Maybe it can handle things better there with fewer and smaller problems." Then the Communists took all the South China. Another myth gone, but its work of lulling us to sleep for some crucial months had been well done.

Then came the myth that the Communists in China could not be a threat to us because, “They would not be able to convert the Chinese to Communism.” I do not know whether they can or not. I hope they cannot. But the argument is pointless. They have not been able as yet to convert many people to Communism, beginning with Russians. The Communists do not claim to have more than 3% of the Russians, 6% of the Poles, 8% of the Czechs. Would you suggest, therefore, that they do not control those countries and cannot use their resources and strength against us?

We naively assume that the Communists are trying to persuade 51% of the people to join their party because that’s what a political party does in this country. But Communists don’t work that way. They know that if they get a majority of the people in their part, they will have as much trouble as our parties hare having -- factions fighting among themselves. They want only a small percent of the population of a country to form the nucleus, a completely regimented iron core that will control the rest. Why do we insist on projecting our ideas into their minds, and then denounce them, when they don’t operate according to our ideas?

Then we were assured, “Do not worry; the Reds will not be able to make good soldiers of the Chinese. They cannot fight, you know.” Well, go ask the Marines in Korea about that one.

But even before that was exploded, they had another myth ready. They always have one ready to keep you slumbering while they make hay. They do not try to persuade you actually to join the Communists, or even to support them directly. They just persuade you not to be alarmed, or to do anything about Communist gains, which of course amounts to the same thing.

Then the myth makers said, “Do not worry, the Communists will not be able to solve China’s economic problems.” The answer is of course they would not. The argument, however, is completely irrelevant. They have not been able to solve the economic problems of any country they have taken. Look at Poland, Czechoslovakia, Russia herself. But would you suggest that they do not have those countries in their grasp, using their resources and manpower against us?

Where did anyone get the notion that their objective was to solve people’s economic problems? To improve the conditions under which people live is what we would do if we were going into China, as we did do when in the Philippines, but that is not a Communist objective. Their objective is conquest, and that which would be total economic breakdown to us is an asset to them.

And then recently there was the “Morass” theory. This was the myth that the great seething bog of Chinese problems would defeat any interloper. Three years ago I was on a Town Meeting of the Air program with Owen Lattimore. His smooth line was: “Don’t worry about Russian influence in China. Stalin may be dumb, but he is not dumb enough to get mixed up in that Chinese morass.” Well, it is pretty clear to me he got mixed up in it, and he seems to be doing quite well too.

There was another argument: “that Chinese Communism does such good things for the people; they are better off under it.” The Chinese Communists did do what appeared to be good things in the early days. Every movement does that in the early days. The Germans were better off under Hitler for a time. No question about that. They had more calories than anybody else in Central Europe. If bread is all there is to it, they had more bread. He fixed up the factories; the people were full of enthusiasm and zeal. There were nice clean, attractive sanitary rest rooms in the factories, maternity benefits, for instance, summer vacations -- free. Until you have to pay for them, you know! Were not those good? No, they were not good when the people lost their freedom in the process.

So the Communists made the Chinese people of the country better off in the beginning while their objective was to overthrow the Chinese government, and that meant they had to make the people in the cities hungry and restless, and in a mood to revolt.

I was under them eight months in 1930, during one of their “honeymoons.” When they have a great deal of trouble they always have a death bed conversion until they get out of trouble. That has always meant the farmer had all his grain to eat himself, more than he ever had before. He was fatter, and that was what the newspapermen and sometimes the missionaries reported. The people were better off. But it did not last longer than was necessary for the Reds to get their hold fastened on the people. The people in the worse districts have been better off within the last few weeks. The government in Peiping has repeatedly talked about rising unrest and resistance. They

even said there was an increase of peasant resistance. Isn't it strange that people would turn against the wonderful benevolent utopia that Communism supposedly brings in?

For the last couple of years there has been a new myth to beguile us, that the Communists in China will develop Titoism. Communism is still going to be different in Asia! The line was that if you just recognize them, give them some more territory, for example Formosa, help them succeed -- somehow that will cause them to fail. If you have difficulty with that, maybe the State Department can explain it to you. I had thought that the way to overcome an enemy was to cause him to fail, but their idea was to help him succeed. And then he would become like Tito.

There never was a shred of evidence to indicate that Mao Tse-tung would be a Tito, even if he could. Chiang Kai-shek became the original Tito in 1927. Mao has been the number one anti-Tito in the world. His life work has been to destroy Chiang and Titoism. He's been the Soviet Union's most loyal satellite for twenty-nine years, even under the most difficult and seemingly hopeless circumstances. But when Communism is winning and we're losing in Asia, then he is supposed to desert Stalin and join us. One wonders how crazy people can get.

Besides, Mao couldn't be a Tito if he would. Why? Because the Soviet Union can so easily control Manchuria, the Ruhr of Asia. That was fixed up at Yalta, you recall. Mao cannot make it without the resources of Manchuria anymore than Chiang could. You can be sure the Kremlin is determined not to have any more Titoism. If Mao should deviate in the least from what the

Kremlin wants him to do, it would close down on his jugular vein in Manchuria and he would be done for.

Perhaps the most widely believed myth is that even if Communism wins in China, the Chinese will overcome it eventually. China has been conquered again and again. She has always absorbed her conquerors and therefore she will absorb this conqueror, too.

There are two comments to make on that. One is that to argue that China will overcome the Communists just because she overcame her previous conquerors is about as intelligent as it would be for me to say to a man who has cancer, “Well, my friend, that’s rather serious, but I wouldn’t be unduly alarmed about it. You’ll probably get over it because you got over all your previous diseases, didn’t you? -- Measles, diphtheria, scarlet fever, and tonsillitis -- you got over all of those diseases, so you should get over this one too.” Unfortunately that does not follow. People die of cancer every day who never died before; it is the very first time. Cancer is a different disease. Just so, the Communist conquest of China is as different from her previous conquests, as tuberculosis of the lungs is from bronchitis.

I have a deep feeling -- not based on any demonstrable reasons -- that somehow the Chinese will eventually be able to pull through their present ordeal to real independence again. I have more confidence that they will, than I have that we will, for they’re tougher. They don’t expect so much. They aren’t as brittle as we; won’t blow up the way we may when we have to face

reduced standards of living in the reasonably near future. But if the Chinese should be able eventually to overcome the Communists, there is still the big question -- how long will it take? Well, it took the Chinese 100 years to overcome the Mongol conquerors. It took them 267 to overcome the Manchus. Maybe they could overcome the Communists sometime in the next few hundred years. But what happens to you and me in the meantime, and our children and our country? I can't get much comfort out of that.

I've run through some of the myths about Communism in China merely to point out how easy it is for determined and skillful propagandists who know what they want and who are not bothered with any scruples regarding the truth, to put over on supposedly smart people whatever they want us to believe. They kept many Americans from recognizing communism in Asia as an enemy of ourselves -- and thereby helped lead to weakening of our side and strengthening of theirs until they felt strong enough to attack our forces in Korea.

There was another major technique which they used to weaken our side while strengthening their own. It was to divert our attention from our own security interests by concentrating on the weaknesses of those who, whatever their faults were, were our friends. Whenever the proposal to give proper aid to the government of China came up, they always used five adjectives. "But the government of China is inept, incompetent, inefficient, undemocratic and corrupt." I've heard that so many times, and from high officials in our government -- as if that rather than China's independence were the important thing from the standpoint of our country's security; or as if

those same adjective could not be used to describe our own government too -- and with much less excuse in our case. The propagandists and their dupes roll those five adjectives off their tongues and that's supposed to finish the matter.

But just stop and look at it a moment. What does the statement prove? Only that the government of China after 800 years of invasion, inflation, and all that goes with them was inept, incompetent, inefficient, undemocratic and corrupt. It proves the patient is very sick, doctor. You're going to have to work harder than you thought in order to pull the patient through. But you've got to save the patient if you would save yourself. The desperate condition of the patient is not reason for going off and abandoning him. Rather it is the challenge which it is your job to meet. What kind of doctor would I be if I were to say, "I don't want this patient? He's got everything wrong with hi. Let me have an easy one!"

This is my quarrel with the State Department. It is why some of us have called openly for Mr. Acheson's resignation. I have nothing against him as a man. But he is convinced that nothing can be done in China because the conditions are so bad. As long as he and others with that view are in charge why of course, nothing effective can be done. Where there is no will there is no way. The difficulties in China -- and they are great -- are the problems it is the business of responsible statesmanship to solve; not an alibi for not solving them. And if those now in authority don't see anything to be done, then they should please step aside and let those take over who do see what

can be done, -- for the permanent loss of China to Communism can be fatal to our own country's security and will leave no possibility of ever getting an independent and secure Korea.

There were three prominent American men who said nothing could be done: General Stilwell, General Marshall who followed him, and General Barr. But over against them, there's a whole group of just as able men who have just as much information and just as good training -- and who say it can be done and must be done.

Among them is General MacArthur. He is hardly an arm-chair theorist. Wedemeyer is not an amateur; he succeeded in China precisely where Stilwell failed. Chennault has a rather good record of doing what other people said couldn't be done. Seven Admirals in succession in charge of our Asiatic Fleet said to a man that the job can and must be done -- Admiral Yarnell and Admiral Hart before the war. Admiral Barbey, the first one who went in after the war and then was taken out because he fought so outspokenly against the reckless policy of turning China over to the Soviet Union after his men had fought clear across the Pacific to keep Japan from getting China's manpower and resources and developing them against ourselves. He was succeeded by Admiral Kinkaid who eyes just flash when he talks about the mess our Government's policy of negativism and defeatism has made out there. You wouldn't call Kinkaid a know-nothing or just "emotional about Chiang Kai-shek." He was followed by Admiral Charles Cooke. He's pretty good too, you know, so good that he planned most of the brilliant strategy of our Pacific campaigns. He is so concerned about helping Chinese stop Communist expansion that he is out

in Formosa now, working on his own as a private citizen to help save an ally he knows is so important to his country. And he was followed by Admiral Badger and then Admiral Redford.

Now, there are three men who failed in China. They say it can't be done. But there are ten other men, equally able, who succeeded. They say it can be done. Whose judgment are you going to take, the judgment of men who failed in a given situation and understandably are defeatist or even bitter, or the judgment of men who succeeded? I'll take the latter, every time.

If I'm sick, I don't want a doctor who can explain to me, in no matter how perfect English, why he can't get me well. I want one who is determined to find a way to get me well. Otherwise, I want a new doctor.

Another part of the technique of diverting our attention from our own interests is to reiterate that the government of China, (or the government of Greece, or the government of any Asian country marked for Red conquest -- the same line everywhere) is so bad that it doesn't deserve our help. The answer is: Of course, it doesn't deserve our help.

There is no country that deserves our help. Our government is not a charitable institution. The issue is not whether these governments deserve our help but whether your boy deserves the better chance to live, and this requires our help to other peoples in defending their own soil. Otherwise American boys will have to defend it, -- for the sake of their own country's security.

The real issue is whether we are to have four hundred fifty million Chinese on our side against the enemy, or on the enemy's side against us.

Let's not let ourselves be diverted any longer by the skillful propaganda playing up the weaknesses that exist in other countries and playing down the strengths that also exist there and playing down the importance to ourselves of their being independent of Russian control and friendly to ourselves.

May I mention one more miscalculation that led to the Communist victory in China and attack upon Korea -- the notion that the way to get good relations with armed Communist aggression is to give it what it says it wants? How much longer are we to follow that disastrous road -- appeasement?

It was tried at Teheran. We gave Russia there what she said she wanted. At Yalta we gave her the additional things she then wanted. At Potsdam we gave her the still more things she then said she wanted.

In China, General Marshall got the Generalissimo to give the Communists what they said they wanted; a truce and cease-fire by government troops which the Reds used to expand their territory five-fold, strict neutrality by America, breaking of our agreements to furnish certain

military supplies to the government forces the constitutional convention, and many other concessions. The policy led, of course, not to peace but to war in China -- and to defeat in it.

Some Americans, plus Stalin, still contend that we must give the Chinese Communists what they say they now want -- Korea, Formosa, and a seat in the United Nations -- in order to get "peace" with them. Abandoning Korea to them would not end the conflict; it would merely transfer it to Japan.

Abandoning Formosa to them would not give peace; it would just move the struggle to the Philippines.

Giving them Japan and the Philippines would not solve the problem; it would transfer the line of resistance to Alaska and Hawaii. Because what they say they want is not what they want. What they want is world conquest. As the Chinese say, the only way you can get unity with a tiger is inside the tiger.

Another device for conquering a country is the creation of confusion. Malik did not get what he appeared to want at Lake Success. But he got plenty of what he really was after -- confusion.

Communists use the same tricks in the domestic field. They emphasize all the bad conditions in our country -- Jim Crowism, the discriminations, the slums, the inadequate education or medical

care in some places, etc. There is no society that is not improvable, and the Communists shout about the bad conditions more than anybody else. But they don't try to correct them. The last thing they want is to get them eliminated. Then they wouldn't have anything to agitate about. Their purpose is not to remedy the bad conditions. The purpose is to exploit them, to inflame them, to aggravate them, to stir them up, to divide people, to make them lose faith in themselves and their system of government. The objective is to bring people to such despair about themselves that they think nothing much can be done. Then the country can be taken over.

The question is no longer, shall we strike first? It is too late for us to strike first. The Kremlin has already struck. The question is how and where shall we strike back?

We must recognize that a major way to prevent Russian aggression elsewhere is to prevent the complete subjugation of China, Korea and the rest of Asia. With satellites and security all along her Asia front, Russia could move all her forces to Europe or the Middle East and confront us with almost unbeatable strength. Therefore we must compel her to divide her strength and her attention between two widely separated fronts -- her east and her west. I cannot believe the hard-headed realists in the Kremlin will get themselves into a two-front war.

Thus our most immediate concern must be not the war that we might get into in Europe, but the war we are already in in Asia. For the best way to prevent the big war for the world is to win the littler war for Asia.

How can we win the war for Asia and the genuine independence of the countries there so that their great potential strength cannot be used by the Kremlin against us? Let me mention a few of the steps.

First, use our own strength where and how it can be used to greatest advantage. That means, insofar as possible, where we are strongest and the enemy weakest -- sea and air; and not where we are weakest and the enemy is strongest - on the land.

I opposed our withdrawing all our forces from Korea in June, 1949. But after they had been withdrawn, inviting the Communists to attack, I opposed sending American ground forces back in. I feared that the political losses of having white men in direct physical combat with men of other races in Asia might outweigh the military gains, even if we should win all the victories.

But once the decision had been made to send American and United Nations forces into Korea, naturally I supported the effort fully and believe we should stay on in Korea -- if we can without too great cost. First, because the moral effect on the other nations of Asia would be disastrous if we were just to pull out. They would have no choice but to succumb, going down like ten pins.

However, if we should be forced by superior strength to withdraw, that need not be fatal. All through history armies have been defeated and compelled to withdraw from a given operation --

not as an end of the struggle, but to change to other strategies or locations in order to wage it more advantageously and successfully.

Second, because 20 million people in South Korea have exhibited magnificent steadfastness and faithfulness to us with almost no defections. All Asia should be reminded constantly that several million Koreans voluntarily chose to leave their homes and move south to stay with the government of South Korea and ourselves; none have gone from south to north. That reveals eloquently the lies about the Utopia which Communism is supposed to set up. Not what propaganda says, but what did ordinary people do -- that is what those on the fence will believe. Let us exploit that object lesson diligently and not throw our loyal Korean allies to the wolves.

Third, because to tie up and weaken many of the best Chinese Communist units in Korea keeps them from attacking elsewhere and thus buys precious time in which to develop a long overdue plan and program for the other areas of Asia.

The Korean operation does not make sense, in fact it is criminal sacrifice of American lives, unless it is part of a comprehensive strategy for all of East Asia, designed to protect or liberate it from Soviet conquest. Korea can have no real future until the Communist rule across the border in Manchuria is broken.

A second step is to support and build up the strength of the areas in Asia still free so that they can defend themselves. That means most immediately Japan, Formosa and the Philippines. Our choice in Formosa, for example, is not between the Chinese government and something better; it is between giving effective aid to the Chinese government forces, or having the Communists take over, which would be infinitely worse. What they need is not so much more aid as proper aid, the kind we gave in Greece. As long as we refuse to give vigorous support to those opposing Communist aggression in Asia because they do not yet come up to our standards, we actually are intervening decisively in favor of our enemies, the Communists. That is the worst possible alternative.

Third, we must support and build up the anti-Communist resistance movements on the mainland of China so that they can liberate their country. China is today the weakest spot in the whole Soviet world set-up. Here is the place where we can deliver the strongest blow against the enemy with minimum risk and cost to ourselves. The thousands of anti-Communist guerilla bands have the chance to do to the Communists exactly what the latter did to the Nationalist forces. Not a mass invasion from Formosa like that from England to Normandy, but harassing hit-and-run raids on the mainland, smuggling of agents, supplies, airdrops and reinforcement across the channel.

The Chinese people should be told that as they succeed in liberating themselves, we or the United Nations will help them elect governments of their own choosing as was done in Greece

and Korea. To gain independence promptly for even the three southern provinces of China where the resistance forces are strongest, is the best and cheapest way, perhaps the only way to save Indo-China, Burma, the rest of Southeast Asia and India itself. Why are not our most resourceful minds being commissioned to work at this day and night, as MacArthur has urged for so long?

To make the Communist drive in China fail can break the whole movement in Asia. It would shatter the myth of its invincibility, the belief that its victory is inevitable, which belief has had such a paralyzing influence on so many minds ranging from Nehru's to Acheson's. We cannot liberate the Chinese from without; but we can enable them to liberate themselves from within.

The urgent question is not whether we should help them but whether and how we can get them into a position to help us. We must act at once. Given another year, the Reds may be able to liquidate the opposition, and then Asia cannot be saved without our own involvement in combat with terrific cost and losses to ourselves. I do not want to have to send American soldiers into any Asia battlefield.

Whatever the cost of such an effort now, our choice is not between that and something less, it is between that cost and something more. Let us end the dawdling and daydreaming of the last five years and get going in earnest. One cannot guarantee that we will succeed if we try, but one can guarantee that we will not succeed if we don't try immediately.

If the defeatist and appeaser bloc in the State Department is still trying more to justify its past than to win the future let us at least demand that a mission of top-notch leaders be sent to Formosa to survey the situation. Much more was known about Western Europe, yet Eisenhower was sent to give us a fresh report. The State Department refused to let Johnson, Pace, Bradley, Dulles, Jessup or any other top leader go to Formosa. Why? When MacArthur went to see for himself those who oppose any real effort with the Chinese violently condemned him. Who is it that is so determined to prevent our succeeding in China and the saving of American lives in Korea which such success in China would bring? We must get our future into the hands of persons more interested in winning victories than in explaining defeats.

Lastly, we must take the offensive and win the ideological war in Asia. Why are we so clumsy at that as compared to the communists when we have so much better a product to sell?

Some people say it is poverty that leads to Communism. No, it is Communist propagandists that lead to Communism. They go to the people in poverty or the people who have been discriminated against or the people who live in slums or the people who can't get education; they pick out whatever it is that the people do not have and say: "We'll give you this if you will go with us and help overthrow the bad system under which you live." And if anybody else comes along to point out the falsity of their promises or offers a good alternative, you can't blame many for going along with the propagandists. We must do a better job with our ideas. We can't win this struggle just by holding back the Soviet glacier by force. We have to do that; we can't win

unless we do, because once it sweeps over a country, we can't get a chance to use our ideas no matter how much better they may be. But while helping hold back the aggression, we must work to win the war of ideas. We've got to present the constructive and better alternative, and HOPE!

Why aren't we showing the people in poverty in a hundred ways that Communism is a lie, a fake, a phony! What people has it ever helped get out of their poverty? Not one, including the Russians. The only way any people has ever been able to improve its lot for long is by working for its freedom and then establishing good government responsible to the people. Why are we not saying to the oppressed millions everywhere, "Strive your hardest to overthrow the tyranny under which you suffer? Let us work together to build government of the people and by the people and therefore, for the people. Together, we can build a free and good society."

The Communists do so much better selling their lies than we do selling the truth. I don't know why. What are we afraid of? What are we ashamed of?

Fortunately, we don't have to tell lies about the United States but we do have to tell the truth. Jesus did not say just "The truth shall make you free." He said, "You shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." How can they know the truth unless we tell it and tell it?

What our nation needs most of all is what Abraham Lincoln prayed for at Gettysburg -- “Under God, a new birth of freedom.” A new understanding of what freedom really means, a new dedication to it.

We must make our system based on freedom work better here at home and give it a better chance to spread abroad. If we will do these things with vigor and faith and contagious enthusiasm, I believe the tide of tyranny still can be turned back without a world war and can secure one more the blessings of liberty for ourselves our children.